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Many observers of domestic and international affairs regard the increased par-
ticipation of civil society as one of the most important developments in policy-
making over the past few decades.1 Although who is or should be considered a
part of civil society remains contested,2 civil society is usually deªned in terms
of voluntary social relationships as well as civic and social institutions that are
distinct from state structures and the market.3 This deªnition mirrors Steffek
and Nanz,4 who regard civil society as all actors that have legal personality rec-
ognized by at least one country but do not belong to or are not afªliated with
ofªcial governmental entities. Civil society, thus, includes a wide range of orga-
nizations such as community groups, nongovernmental organizations, labor
unions, charitable organizations, professional associations, and foundations.
Much of the academic literature views increased civil society participation
in a positive light. For instance, many authors claim that civil society can en-
hance the quality of policy-making by providing information, increasing fair-
ness in procedural and outcome terms, enhancing transparency and account-
ability, and giving a voice to less powerful social groups in a country.5 In fact,
civil society is widely regarded as a crucial component of democratic, equitable,
and cohesive societies.6
* This paper has been written in the context of the Swiss NCCR research program “Challenges to
Democracy in the 21st Century” (http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch). The authors acknowl-
edge support for data collection from the International Union for Conservation of Nature
(IUCN), Gland, Switzerland. Finally, we thank our editorial team at Global Environmental Poli-
tics, Jennifer Clapp, Matthew Paterson, and Ron Mitchell, and the anonymous reviewers for
highly useful comments. Supplemental material, the dataset, and the replication ªles referred
to in the text can be obtained from the authors upon request and at http://www.ib.ethz.ch/
research/data.
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Environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs)—on which
this paper concentrates—are a prominent example in this respect. The involve-
ment of ENGOs in global environmental governance has grown enormously
over recent decades. ENGOs have become regular participants in negotiation
processes and exert clearly visible pressure on states.7 Existing research shows
that ENGOs can affect international cooperation by generating new norms,8 by
motivating governments and legislatures to negotiate international agreements,9
and by using “their technical, organizational, and lobbying skills”10 to enhance
the ratiªcation of, enforcement of, and compliance with international environ-
mental agreements (IEAs). Furthermore, the existing literature argues that both
democracy and ENGOs tend to promote international cooperation, for example
by facilitating formal participation in IEAs, when treated as separate factors.
Does this imply that the impact of ENGOs is stronger in democracies? Existing
research assumes so but does not offer explicit theoretical arguments or empiri-
cal support for this assumption. This article addresses this research gap.
We outline three theoretical arguments for why ENGOs may not wield
stronger inºuence in democracies. The net effect resulting from these arguments
is a “democracy-civil society paradox” in global environmental governance: we
hypothesize that ENGOs generally enhance states’ participation in IEAs. This
positive effect, however, decreases with higher levels of democracy. This argu-
ment is counterintuitive, since democracy tends to be associated both with a
more active civil society and greater international cooperation.
The ªrst argument focuses on the demand for environmental public
goods. It notes that democracies are characterized by greater civil liberties and,
hence, provide multiple channels—besides ENGOs—through which demands
for ratiªcation of IEAs can be expressed. The second argument considers politi-
cal leaders’ incentives. We argue that democratic policy-makers have strong in-
centives to satisfy “green” demands through the ratiªcation of IEAs, even when
ENGOs are weak or absent. The third argument focuses on collective action
problems. Democracies are characterized by stronger competition for political
inºuence among ENGOs. This may weaken the inºuence of ENGOs (relative to
other political actors) on governments’ ratiªcation behavior. All three argu-
ments point in the same direction, namely towards a net effect of a democracy-
civil society paradox: the very same forces that initially help ENGOs to form and
operate, i.e., democratic regime characteristics, eventually constrain their politi-
cal inºuence when it comes to pushing democracies toward more cooperative
behavior in global environmental governance.
We employ new data on ENGOs in 153 countries for the period 1973–
2006 to assess the empirical relevance of the hypothesized effect, using a quan-
titative duration model approach that reºects our theory. The results strongly
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support the argument: the positive effect of ENGOs on countries’ ratiªcations of
IEAs can be observed on average, but it is clearly weaker in democracies than in
non-democratic regimes.
Determinants of IEA Ratiªcation
Existing research primarily focuses on ªve types of determinants of interna-
tional cooperation as measured in the form of countries’ participation in IEAs:
(1) treaty design characteristics; (2) economic globalization; (3) political re-
gime type; (4) ENGOs and their leverage; and (5) contingent behavior of coun-
tries, where a country’s cooperative behavior is inºuenced by other countries’
actions.11 Some of the most robust empirical ªndings in this literature pertain to
a positive impact of democracy and ENGOs, respectively, on countries’ coopera-
tive behavior.
With respect to democracy, several authors argue that democracies, relative
to non-democracies, are more likely to provide environmental public goods,
i.e., environmental quality at the national level,12 and are more inclined to co-
operate in international environmental problem-solving efforts as well.13 The
underlying argument is that democratic governments depend on the median
voter for their political survival and therefore tend to provide more (environ-
mental) public goods than autocratic regimes.14 In democratic states, constitu-
encies also beneªt from greater civil liberties, including freedom of speech,
press, and association. These enable them to voice concerns over environmental
problems more effectively both at the national and international level.
Empirically, Neumayer, for example, ªnds that democracies are more
likely than autocracies to participate in several IEAs.15 He concludes that “a
spread of democracy around the world will lead to enhanced environmen-
tal commitment worldwide.”16 Similarly, Fredriksson and Gaston17 and Neu-
mayer18 examine the impact of various country characteristics on the time
elapsed until countries ratiªed the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), and treaties on endangered species, biological diversity,
and ozone layer depletion. Both studies ªnd evidence that democratic countries
join these agreements faster than non-democracies. Also, Bernauer et al. analyze
a sample of global environmental treaties between 1950 and 2000.19 They con-
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clude that democracies are more willing to ratify such agreements, although this
effect appears to stem from political systems’ demand side: greater civil liberties
allow for more public pressure on governments to behave cooperatively at the
international level.
With respect to ENGOs, the existing literature claims that strong networks
of ENGOs create political leverage over governments.20 This leverage can be
used to push governments toward more international cooperation—even in the
absence of strong government incentives for doing so in the ªrst place. ENGOs
may, in this context, act as instigators, organizers, and ampliªers of public de-
mand for more environmental protection. Increased public demand then cre-
ates incentives both for opportunistic and sincere policy-makers to negotiate
and, subsequently, ratify IEAs.21
Empirical research on the impact of ENGO leverage, however, tends to suf-
fer from incomplete or inaccurate data for the main explanatory variable, i.e.,
ENGOs, due to missing values, low reliability, or a limited scope stemming
from purely cross-sectional designs. Still, several studies obtain some empirical
support for the hypothesis that ENGOs positively inºuence environmental co-
operation. For example, Roberts et al.22 use a cross-sectional design for studying
the ratiªcation rates of 22 IEAs between 1946 and 1999. They observe that one
of the most important predictors of countries’ cooperative behavior is pressure
from civil society as measured by the number of ENGOs registered in a country.
Roberts et al. conclude that “the number of [E]NGOs in a nation appears virtu-
ally synonymous with its likelihood to participate in environmental treaties.”23
Moreover, Zilbauer examines ratiªcation delays with respect to ªve IEAs as a
function of ENGO inºuence, among other factors.24 He ªnds that ENGOs re-
duce ratiªcation delays in four out of ªve agreements.
Finally, Fredriksson and Ujhelyi argue that a large number of veto players
in a political system makes lobbying more costly for ENGOs and, consequently,
it reduces the positive impact of ENGOs on countries’ treaty participation.25
These scholars use duration models to analyze this argument for one particular
IEA, the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCC. While it remains unclear whether this
argument applies to other IEAs, the results support their theory: increased
ENGO leverage motivated countries to ratify the Kyoto Protocol more rapidly,
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but this effect declines with more veto players in a given political system.
In a related study, Fredriksson et al. argue that ENGOs ªnd it easier to lobby
policy-makers in countries with high levels of corruption. They ªnd that
ENGOs facilitated the ratiªcation of the Kyoto Protocol, while this effect—
perhaps counterintuitively—was stronger in more corrupt countries.26
In the next section, we develop a theoretical argument that builds on an
inconsistency between the “conventional wisdom” and the argument by Fred-
riksson and Ujhelyi.27 Conventional wisdom assumes that the effect of ENGOs
increases with higher levels of democracy, because environmental interests, i.e.,
the median voter demand for (environmental) public goods, can be promoted
more effectively in countries with strong democratic traditions. Fredriksson and
Ujhelyi,28 however, claim that the positive effect of ENGOs on countries’ partici-
pation in IEAs decreases with a higher number of veto players in the political
system, and democracies tend to have more veto players than non-democracies.
ENGOs, Democracy, and the Ratiªcation of IEAs
Typically, ratiªcation is necessary for a country to be legally bound by an IEA.29
Although IEAs per se do not solve environmental problems, they are formal and
legal expressions of countries’ political commitments to address these prob-
lems. Joining such IEAs is usually costly, because it imposes at least some con-
straints on countries’ behavior.
We are concerned with the combined effect of ENGOs and political re-
gime type on countries’ ratiªcation behavior vis à vis IEAs.30 Although the par-
tial and separate effects of both ENGOs and democracy on IEA participation are
likely to be positive, we argue that the positive inºuence of ENGOs decreases at
higher levels of democracy. This contingent effect of ENGOs is counterintuitive
for two reasons. First, the existing literature offers convincing theoretical argu-
ments as well as empirical evidence for the cooperation-promoting effects of
both democracy and ENGOs. Second, democracy is associated with more civil
liberties which enable ENGOs to ºourish. Hence, democracy is likely to inºu-
ence both ENGOs and international cooperation, while ENGOs per se are also
likely to have an effect on cooperation. Figure 1 summarizes the hypothesized
impact. We arrive at this hypothesis on the basis of three interrelated arguments:
the public demand for environmental protection, government incentives to
meet such demand, and collective action problems that civil society might face
in democracies.
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29. We distinguish IEA ratiªcation from participation in international negotiations and the signing
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30. More speciªcally, we focus on the time elapsed until ratiªcation occurs.
Public Demand for Environmental Protection
The ªrst argument holds that the impact of ENGOs on a country’s ratiªcation of
IEAs is likely to be less in democratic than non-democratic regimes, because
democratic political procedures and processes are per se and ex-ante more con-
ducive to “greener” policies. Payne, for example, shows that democracies are
more likely than non-democratic regimes to protect their natural environment,
since democracies are characterized by more civil liberties, e.g., freedom of
speech, press, and association.31 These liberties imply that people are better in-
formed by independent mass media and other sources about environmental
problems and governmental policies. Democratic constituencies also have more
opportunities to freely express their opinions and organize around alternative
political views. Hence, they can impose higher audience costs on policy-makers
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Figure 1.
Expected Effect of ENGOs on Treaty Ratiªcation in Democracies
who renege on electoral promises.32 Consistent with this argument, Page and
Shapiro highlight that there is substantial congruence between public opinion
and governmental policies in democratic systems, and that shifts in public opin-
ion tend to cause policy changes in such systems—especially with respect to is-
sues that are considered to be salient by society.33
Thus, for any given level of environmental risk exposure, people in demo-
cratic countries have greater opportunities than their counterparts in non-
democratic systems to obtain information on environmental problems and
potential actions for their mitigation. Moreover, if people in democracies are
concerned about environmental problems, they can engage in multiple types
of action aimed at pushing their government toward stronger environmental
commitment.
Consequently, more civil liberties are associated with a greater variety of
sources of information as well as a greater scope and scale of potential actions
of people vis-à-vis the government. These conditions reduce the importance of
ENGOs as instigators, organizers, and ampliªers of public demand, because
more civil liberties allow for channels other than ENGOs through which envi-
ronmental information is disseminated and environmental concerns can be ex-
pressed. Therefore, the inºuence and importance of ENGOs as public demand
instigators, organizers, and information providers decreases with higher levels
of democracy in a political system. This, in turn, reduces the ENGO impact on
ratiªcation of IEAs.
Government Incentives to Meet Public Demand
The median voter in democratic systems has a major impact on the government
provision of public goods, in our case, environmental quality.34 Democratic po-
litical leaders have strong incentives to satisfy their constituencies’ environmen-
tal policy demands to obtain and retain political ofªce.35
Bueno de Mesquita et al. argue that political selection processes inºuence
the extent to which governments provide public goods relative to private
goods.36 At the core of their argument on why democracies outperform non-
democratic regimes in public goods provision is the rationale that political lead-
ers must ensure the continuous support and satisfaction of their winning coali-
tion. The latter is the group of people whose support is decisive for political
leaders to obtain or retain ofªce. In contrast to democracies, non-democratic
political leaders typically depend on the support of a smaller winning coalition.
This coalition can be compensated with private selective incentives that only
beneªt those supporting the leader. The beneªts of public goods provision,
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however, are more uniformly distributed among the population. As a result, if
non-democratic leaders decide to invest more in public goods rather than accu-
mulating rents and supplying their small, supporting coalition with private
goods, a country’s elite would incur disproportionately high opportunity costs
due to the spending of tax revenues and other resources on public goods provi-
sion. The median voter in a democracy, in contrast, incurs lower marginal costs
of public goods provision, relative to the average member of the economic and
political elite in a non-democracy. This circumstance generates incentives for
democratic governments to provide public goods.
In other words, democratic political leaders are responsive to a larger win-
ning coalition and lack sufªcient resources to reward their comparatively large
group of supporters with private goods. Therefore, they resort to the provision
of public goods to ensure political support and survive in ofªce. These political-
survival considerations compel democratic policy-makers to provide more pub-
lic goods—including environmental quality—than their non-democratic coun-
terparts. In our context, this means that joining an IEA—and doing so
promptly—is an important opportunity for governments to signal their com-
mitment to the provision of environmental public goods. Policy-makers in
democratic systems have this incentive even if ENGOs are weak or absent, be-
cause it derives from general political system characteristics and median voter
preferences, rather than ENGOs per se. As a result, the impact of ENGOs on
states’ behavior vis à vis IEAs is likely to be weaker in more democratic
countries.
Problems of Collective Action in Democracies
Relative to non-democracies, democratic political systems provide more oppor-
tunities for ENGOs to form and operate,37 which seems conducive to ENGO lev-
erage over state actors. As a result, we should expect the leverage of a strong
ENGO network to drive governments toward more international environmental
cooperation.
One factor that might work against this assumption is a collective ac-
tion problem. Larger ENGO networks are more likely to encounter coordin-
ation problems that reduce their effectiveness in pushing governments toward
greener policies.38 Although larger ENGO networks are likely to create more lev-
erage, the marginal environmental policy returns may become smaller with
more ENGOs. Organizational, lobbying, and campaigning costs increase with
the number of ENGOs because, as an ENGO network becomes larger, the inter-
ests of its members become more heterogeneous.39 Increased heterogeneity hin-
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ders efforts to reach and maintain consensus on how government actors should
be inºuenced and to what end.40
Using a political market analogy, stronger competition between ENGOs
for access to and inºuence over policy-makers may constrain the inºuence of
ENGOs as a whole, as compared to an oligopolistic market, in which a small
number of ENGOs competes for political inºuence. In the words of one ENGO
member: “when so many different [ENGO] actors are drawn into the process,
there is a danger that our demands may be blunted [. . .]. Consequently, we may
end up with a ‘lowest common denominator’ which is no better than the kind
of compromises diplomats engage in.”41
Increased competition of this kind is more likely to occur in democracies
because the latter provide more opportunities for ENGOs to form and operate.
Again, this means that the ENGO effect on participation in IEAs should be posi-
tive on average, but decreases with higher levels of democracy in a political
system. This argument is somewhat similar to that of Fredriksson and Ujhelyi,
who claim that more veto players decrease the positive impact of ENGOs on the
likelihood that a country will ratify any given IEA.42 However, our theoretical ra-
tionale for this effect is different. While Fredriksson and Ujhelyi assume that
veto players have resolved their collective action problem, we view such prob-
lems as one of several factors that reduce ENGO leverage.
In sum, the three arguments developed in this section reinforce each
other. We should expect a positive effect of ENGOs on country participation in
IEAs. But this impact is likely to be smaller in countries that are highly demo-
cratic. Although the three arguments outlined here are distinct, we do not regard
them as separate causal mechanisms that require separate and explicit compari-
son, but rather as a set of related theoretical reasons for expecting a declining
ENGO effect as level of democracy increases. Consequently, the following em-
pirical analysis focuses on the net effect of ENGOs on countries’ participation in
IEAs.
Research Design
Dependent Variable and Methodology
Our empirical evaluation focuses on countries’ ratiªcation behavior vis-à-vis
IEAs, and in particular the time elapsed between signature and ratiªcation. We
concentrate on duration because we interpret the differences in time that coun-
tries need to ratify an IEA as reºecting relative preference intensities. More
rapid ratiªcation signals a strong commitment to global environmental cooper-
ation.43 Hence, we deªne our dependent variable as the time (in years) between
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the date when an IEA becomes open for ratiªcation and the date a country
ratiªes that agreement.
The data for ratiªcation behavior are taken from Bernauer et al.44 Follow-
ing these scholars, we treat different legal expressions of formally joining a
treaty, e.g., accession, as equivalent to ratiªcation. We also drop treaties that do
not deal with environmental issues as central concerns. And ªnally, we omit
IEAs that opened for ratiªcation before 197345 or that are not open to all coun-
tries globally. The resulting dataset covers 153 countries and 268 global envi-
ronmental treaties between 1973 and 2006.46 The unit of analysis is the IEA-
country-year, i.e., each IEA is paired with each country that could potentially rat-
ify this IEA in a given year. IEAs enter the dataset as soon as they become open
for ratiªcation. Each IEA-country pair remains in the dataset until the year the
respective country ratiªes the IEA and is then dropped.47 All of our explanatory
variables described below vary over time. Because a change in any of these vari-
ables requires a new spell or observation, our unit of analysis is equivalent to
such a speciªc spell. In total, we obtain 555,175 spells. Out of the 41,004 IEA-
country pairs in the dataset, 31,077 are right censored, i.e., ratiªcation did not
take place by 2006, 2002, and 2000, respectively. The average ratiªcation dura-
tion of a country is 9.67 years.
Since we do not impose a particular functional form of the baseline haz-
ard of ratifying an agreement, we estimate Cox proportional hazards models.
This leaves the duration dependency unspeciªed and focuses the empirical
analysis on how the covariates shift the baseline hazard. Checking our models
and variables for violation of the proportionality assumption showed the pro-
portionality assumption was violated in some of our models. However, includ-
ing interaction terms for all explanatory variables with some pre-deªned func-
tion of time48 does not change the substance of our results. More speciªcally, we
obtain opposite signs and very small coefªcients for our main variables of inter-
est, i.e., ENGO leverage and level of democracy, and the interaction term be-
tween these two. A sign opposite to that of the constituent term indicates decay
in the original effect. The rate of the time trend is indicated by the coefªcient for
the interaction with time in relation to the constituent term. If the interaction
term with time is small in comparison, the effect changes slowly over time; if it
is large, then the effect changes quickly. Exponentiating the ratio of the constitu-
ent coefªcient to the interaction coefªcient indicates the point in time at which
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an effect “ºips” from positive to negative or vice versa.49 For example, we esti-
mated that the effect of ENGO dies out after about 9,902 years in Model 1 be-
low. Hence, we omit interaction terms with a function of time to facilitate
interpretation.
Explanatory Variables
Our two main explanatory variables are the political leverage of ENGOs and a
country’s level of democracy. We deªne ENGO leverage in terms of the number
of national ENGOs50 registered in a country.51 We collected the data for the time
period 1973-2006 in the archives of the International Union for Conservation
of Nature (IUCN). The IUCN claims to be “the world’s largest and most impor-
tant conservation network,” with a “mission to inºuence, encourage, and as-
sist societies throughout the world to conserve the integrity and diversity of na-
ture.”52 Its members include national and international ENGOs, government
agencies, and scientists from 181 countries. Although the IUCN covers most
countries of the world, it is essentially an umbrella organization where mem-
bership is not mandatory and ENGOs do not have to register. As a result, our
data collection efforts may have omitted some ENGOs that have not registered
with the IUCN. However, our approach was more efªcient than collecting
ENGO data from other sources, and we believe that IUCN’s broad and extensive
coverage allows us to generate a valid and reliable proxy for the political lever-
age of ENGOs.
To measure a country’s level of democracy, we use the combined polity2
variable from the Polity IV project, which ranges from 10 (full autocracy) to
10 (full democracy).53 Since the original data do not include information for
microstates, we impute missing values with data from Gleditsch,54 who provides
information on these countries until 2002. This operationalization may actually
pick up the effect of veto players instead of democracy.55 Indeed, there is a
highly signiªcant correlation between Democracy and Henisz’s POLCONIII
index56 in our dataset (0.7544). However, the correlation between Democracy
and ENGO and between Democracy and Henisz’s POLCONIII index is 0.31 and
0.90, respectively, while tests showed that the two estimates differ signiªcantly.
We also re-estimated our baseline models with Henisz’s POLCONIII index in-
stead of Democracy: the effect of the interaction term of ENGO and POLCONIII
is insigniªcant. These results indicate that our results for the Democracy-ENGO
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interaction term do not pick up the conditioning effect of veto players despite
the fact that Democracy and Henisz’s POLCONIII are highly correlated. Finally,
to model the conditional effect of ENGO, which serves to evaluate the democ-
racy-civil society paradox, we also consider a multiplicative term between
Democracy and ENGO.
With regard to control variables, we employ those used in Bernauer et al.57
to capture alternative factors that may inºuence ratiªcation behavior.58 First, we
include Correlates of War Project data on a country’s membership in interna-
tional organizations (IO Membership), using the number of IOs of which a
country is a member in a given year.59 Second, we include a country’s trade in-
tensity, measured as the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP (Trade
Intensity).60 Third, we add a variable counting the total number of states in the
international system that had ratiªed the IEA in question (Number of Countries
Ratiªed). We also include two variables measuring the percentage of countries
from the same region (Percent of Region Group Ratiªed region) and same income
group that had ratiªed the IEA in question (Percent of Income Group Ratiªed).
Fourth, there is income, measured as the log value of GDP per capita (GDP per
capita). Given the arguments on the Environmental Kuznets Curve, we also in-
clude the square of income. Fifth, the state of the domestic environment may
also inºuence ratiªcation behavior. Thus, we add the log of SO2 emissions per
capita (SO2 per capita), as this type of pollution is arguably the most common
form of air pollution. Finally, we include the log of GDP to capture a country’s
economic power (GDP).
Empirical Findings
Table 1 summarizes the main results of our empirical analysis. We report non-
exponentiated coefªcients: higher values for each explanatory variable signify
faster ratiªcation (i.e., positive coefªcients indicate an increasing hazard and
negative coefªcients indicate a decreasing hazard). We begin with a bivariate
model that only includes ENGO. In Model 2, we add Democracy, while Model 3
constitutes our baseline model, including ENGO, Democracy, and their interac-
tion term. Model 4 adds the control variables.
Table 1 shows that the estimated risk of ratiªcation increases by 3 percent
for each additional ENGO active in a country (Model 1). With the inclusion of
Democracy (Model 2), this positive and rather substantial effect changes to
1.8 percent, with a one-unit increase in Democracy leading to a 6.2 percent in-
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Table 1
Results from Cox Proportional Hazards Models for Time until IEA Ratiªcation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
ENGO (0.030 (0.018 0.035 0.056
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.008)*** (0.007)***
Democracy (0.062 0.065 0.029
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)***
ENGO*Democracy 0.002 0.006)***
(0.001)** (0.001)***
IO Membership 0.013
(0.001)***
Trade Intensity 0.083
(0.035)**
Number of Countries
Ratiªed
0.013
(0.001)***
Percent of Income
Group Ratiªed
0.031
(0.001)***
Percent of Region
Group Ratiªed
0.050
(0.001)***
GDP per Capita 1.544
(0.317)***
GDP per Capita2 0.091
(0.019)***
SO2 per Capita 0.062
(0.019)***
GDP 0.003
(0.027)
N 371,297 248,282 248,282 204,048
Log Likelihood 47,114.71 37,435.78 37,433.33 29,826.90
Time at Risk 350,371.8 228,270 228,270 184,741.1
Time Period 1973–2006 1973–2002 1973–2002 1973–2000
Likelihood Ratio 2 371.97*** 822.03*** 826.94*** 10,360.02***
Standard errors in parentheses; * signiªcant at 10%; ** signiªcant at 5%; *** signiªcant at 1%
(two-tailed).
crease in the estimated risk of ratiªcation. Yet, only Models 3 and 4 include the
interaction term that directly tests our argument. We cannot, however, directly
interpret the components of a multiplicative speciªcation in Table 1.61 There-
fore, we recalculated the non-exponentiated coefªcients for ENGO according to
Democracy to allow for the substantive interpretation depicted in Figure 2.62
Figure 2 offers strong support for the democracy-civil society paradox. Al-
though we still see a positive contribution of ENGO leverage to faster IEA rati-
ªcations, this effect is stronger for non-democratic countries with the inºuence
of ENGO exhibiting only a marginal impact in democracies. The estimated
risk of ratiªcation increases by 5.6 percent if one more ENGO is active in a full
autocracy (Model 3). This ENGO effect is much stronger than in Models 1 or 2,
which do not consider the interaction between ENGO and Democracy. The im-
pact of ENGO then decreases and reaches a positive and still signiªcant value of
1.5 percent (Model 3) in full democracies.
Figure 2 also reveals that the slope of the marginal ENGO effect is steeply
negative, with a negative and signiªcant coefªcient estimate for ENGO in Model
4 even for countries with a Democracy score of 9 or higher. This negative effect
is substantively rather small, however, with an estimated risk of ratiªcation of
about 0.04 percent. We interpret this result as indicating that the marginal ef-
fect of ENGO leverage disappears in highly democratic countries, and that more
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Figure 2.
Effect of ENGO Leverage on Treaty Ratiªcation, Conditional on Democracy
Dashed lines indicate the 95% conªdence interval.
ENGO leverage may, in the extreme, slow down ratiªcation in such states to
some degree.
Figure 3 illustrates our key ªnding in a more nuanced way. We recoded
ENGO into four categories and estimated different survival functions that are
based on the estimates in Model 4. The categories of the recoded ENGO variable
reºect the main characteristics of the original ENGO variable: 0  no ENGOs
registered in the country; 1 1–29 ENGOs registered in the country; 2 30–59
ENGOs registered in the country; 3  60–82 ENGOs registered in the country.
Using these categories, we examine non-democracies (countries with a Democ-
racy score of less than 7) and democracies.63
This ªgure mirrors the results shown in the right panel of Figure 2. ENGO
leverage fosters speedy ratiªcation of IEAs. ENGOs have a powerful marginal ef-
fect in non-democratic countries, but this effect disappears in highly democratic
countries. The left panel of Figure 3 indicates that the difference in impact be-
tween “no ENGOs” and “1–29 ENGOs” is around 6 percent in non-democra-
cies. This means that more ENGO leverage in non-democratic countries has a
strong ratiªcation-promoting effect.
Figure 3 also highlights an unexpected result. We observe that ratiªcation
speed increases by almost 15 percentage points in highly democratic countries
that lack ENGO leverage. We are reluctant to interpret this ªnding in the sense
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63. One caveat here is that neither category 2 nor 3 empirically appears in non-democratic states.
Figure 3.
Estimates of Survival Functions, According to ENGO Leverage and Regime Type
The two panels show survival functions based on semi-parametric Cox Model estimations while all other vari-
ables are held at their mean values.
that ENGOs make global environmental treaty participation more difªcult
in democratic countries. One possible interpretation of this result is that highly
democratic governments in a state with a strong ENGO network are likely to
face stronger pressure to fully and more rapidly implement any given interna-
tional obligation. Such countries may also be more likely to agree to more am-
bitious obligations in a given IEA. One example is the Kyoto Protocol, which al-
locates different emission reduction targets to different countries. To the extent
that these assumptions hold true, highly democratic countries with a strong
ENGO network are then likely to face higher implementation costs, relative to
highly democratic countries that lack ENGO leverage. In other words, it is possi-
ble that the impact of ENGOs declines over the ratiªcation process in highly
democratic countries with increases in demand and, therefore, implementation
costs. The US, which actively participated in negotiating the Kyoto Protocol, but
then failed to ratify this treaty, is a prominent example here.
Concerning the control variables, the effects of IO Membership, Trade Inten-
sity, Percent of Region Group Ratiªed, GDP per Capita and its squared term, and
SO2 per Capita are all in line with results reported in the existing literature. Mem-
bership in international organizations signiªcantly decreases the duration until
ratiªcation occurs. The same holds for the percentage of countries of the same
region that ratiªed an IEA and for domestic environmental conditions. We also
ªnd evidence for a curvilinear relationship between GDP per Capita and ratiªca-
tion duration. A country’s trade openness contributes to slower ratiªcation. In
contrast to ªndings by Bernauer et al.,64 ratiªcation by a given country becomes
slower when a larger share of all other countries has already ratiªed. Similarly, a
larger share of ratiªers in the same income group has a ratiªcation-retarding ef-
fect. The impact of countries’ economic size is insigniªcant.
To assess the robustness of our ªndings, we ran various alternative model
speciªcations. These robustness checks are not discussed here, but are summa-
rized and can be replicated via ªles that are available from the authors and at
http://www.ib.ethz.ch/research/data. The ªndings from these speciªcations sup-
port the results reported here.
Conclusion
The existing literature offers well-developed arguments and empirical evidence
for why democracy and civil society are likely to foster international coopera-
tion. In dealing with both factors separately, however, it assumes that the com-
bined effect is also positive and at least as strong as—or perhaps stronger than—
the sum of their individual effects.
This paper addresses this conjecture from a theoretical viewpoint, with an
empirical focus on how ENGO leverage inºuences countries’ participation in
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global environmental agreements. We developed three distinct theoretical argu-
ments, all of which point to the same outcome, i.e., towards a democracy-civil
society paradox in global environmental governance. The resulting claim is that
the impact of ENGOs on international cooperation is generally positive but is
likely to decrease or even disappear at high levels of democracy. This proposi-
tion cuts against conventional wisdom and appears paradoxical because de-
mocracy is generally associated both with a more active civil society and more
international cooperation.
We based the empirical analysis on a dataset that combines information
on IEA ratiªcations with new data on ENGOs for the time period 1973–2006.
The results strongly support our theory. Although the marginal effect of an
additional ENGO on the ratiªcation of IEAs is strong and positive in the case of
non-democracies, this effect fades and, in the extreme, becomes negative in
highly democratic countries. To our knowledge, this is the ªrst study to system-
atically examine the combined effect of ENGOs and democracy on participa-
tion in IEAs.
From a normative perspective, our results cannot—and, we think, should
not—be used to advocate the obsolescence or irrelevance of ENGOs in democ-
racies. Our argument concerns the marginal rather than the absolute political
leverage of ENGOs. It means that each additional ENGO in a less democratic
system helps to promote that country’s cooperative behavior in global environ-
mental governance more than an additional ENGO in a democracy. The obvi-
ous policy implication is that strengthening ENGOs in less democratic coun-
tries can help considerably in overriding the generally negative autocracy effect
on international cooperation.
Our ªndings suggest interesting questions that are worth pursuing in fur-
ther research. For instance, it would be useful to move beyond the one-
dimensional democracy-autocracy scale and investigate the role of civil society
in different types of democratic and autocratic regimes. Second, our research ad-
dresses only one aspect of global environmental governance, i.e., treaty ratiªca-
tion. Further research could build on our efforts and study the joint impact of
civil society/ENGOs and democracy in other facets of international coopera-
tion, such as agenda-setting, negotiation, or treaty implementation. Finally, it
would be interesting to examine whether our theoretical argument is empiri-
cally relevant in other policy areas, such as human rights or arms control, where
civil society actors have very actively pushed for more international cooperation
as well.
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